Considering recent theoretical accounts on the trajectory of French unionism under localised bargaining, this article examines potential consequences for the country's traditionally largest radical union, Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT).
Introduction
The increasing substitution of sectoral agreements for those struck at company and plant is an established European trend. In France, collective bargaining has historically been conducted at sector level with central agreements concluded between employer associations and unions. Decentralisation of bargaining to the company started from the early 1980s, although the principle of favourability forbade company agreements from providing less favourable terms than those agreed at sector. This principle has been significantly diluted in recent reforms which provide greater autonomy and flexibility in the conclusion of company level agreements (Marginson, 2015) . Such trends have been accompanied by reforms in union representativeness whereby electoral audiences at workplace determine bargaining capacity, rather than presumptions of national representativeness. Recent literature on French industrial relations hints at diverging trajectories for trade unionism in this context of decentralisation. In one strand, greater decentralisation is said to reinforce pre-existing weaknesses in the unions (Howell, 2009 ). Exposed to firms' competitive pressures, workplace unions risk succumbing to a subordinated compliance in ensuring plant viability. However, an alternative interpretation implies that such risks are overstated. Drawing on a macro-cultural account of French industrial relations, it proposes a 'permissive ideational environment' that continues to legitimise and sustain radical action even amid crisis (Parsons, 2013a ; see also Milner, 2002; Milner and Mathers, 2013; Mathers, 2017) .
Given diverging theoretical pathways, the article examines the trajectory of France's traditionally largest radical union, Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) at company and plant level where competitiveness bargaining occurs to preserve plant viability. While scholarship has been conscious of a CGT shift from militancy at the confederal centre (Giraud, 2015) , literature suggests that the confederation's response to bargaining at devolved levels is not well understood. It is difficult to infer workplace behaviour from national confederal trends given traditions of union autonomy at sector and company (Thomas, 2016) . To contribute to knowledge and understanding, the article focuses on CGT company and plant sections syndicales (trade union sections), considering how firm competitive pressures impact radical unions' workplace bargaining, and whether responses pull in the direction of greater cooperation or if more paradigmatic militant stances prevail. Specifically, the article uses a case study examining CGT in the French automotive industry at PSA PeugeotCitroёn (PSA) and Renault across 12 plants over several years after the automotive crisis of 2008. The article shows CGT adopting a pattern of militant opposition towards employers despite sustained job loss and threats to plant viability. We propose several institutional influences encouraging such outcomes. In what follows, the article develops the study's rationale, the research design and findings. The discussion of the case and its potential for more generalised application concludes the piece.
Context: Workplace bargaining and radical unionism in France
The progressive shift from sectoral to company level bargaining in France has been shaped by concerns over employer competitiveness, an issue with added significance in a country where deindustrialisation is pronounced. French manufacturing has seen its share in value-added terms drop to one of the lowest in the Eurozone behind Italy and Spain (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, 2014) . Since 2007, an estimated 345,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost, with foreign competition identified as a primary cause (ibid.). Competition in the global market has eroded the competitiveness of French businesses, both in exports and domestically.
In this context, the state has sought to encourage greater workplace bargaining to aid employer flexibility and bolster competitiveness. Where the 'favourability principle' once forbade company agreements from providing inferior terms to those agreed at sector, 'derogations' now weaken this practice pacts can now provide for less favourable pay that sectoral rates in exchange for job security where employers face economic difficulties and work hours can now be fixed independently of industry agreements. In supporting company level bargaining, the structure of union representation has been reorganised. Since 2008, delegates appointed for negotiations have been selected according to quadrennial elections rather than affiliation to one of the confederations that had been presumed to be nationally representative (Laulom, 2012) . Elections to plant comités d'entreprise (CE) 1 are now the test of representativeness for negotiation rights, with unions needing 10% support to be representative and 30% to sign agreements, although the latter has been revised under the 2016 El-Khomri Law to 50%. The 2008 reforms empowered unions commanding 50% to oppose negotiated agreements, since modified under El-Khomri so that unions with 30% may only refer objections to an employee referendum.
Support from workplace electoral audiences thus determines union capacity to partake in and influence bargaining.
In this context of decentralisation, whither French unionism? Traditions of sectoral bargaining have produced a legacy inhospitable to workplace unionism, exemplified by France's low union density. Consequently, some theorise that decentralisation aggravates pre-existing union weaknesses in the workplace, leading to isolated worker collectivities (Pernot, 2010) . While the growing incidence of non-union bodies is one conduit for this, "severely weakened unions" (Howell, 2009: 236) is another. This reflects notions that firm-specific competitive pressures encourage workplace unions to develop a 'plant egoism', acting in ways that depart from confederal lines (Streeck, 1984) . As Rogers and Streeck (1995: 12) theorise, concessionary pressures on plant unionism raise implications for radical confederations particularly:
For militant unions engaged in political class struggle, the enterprise is a sphere of potential wildcat cooperation with the employer: workers acting on their narrow interest in the health and profitability of "their" firm and disregarding the interests of the working class as a whole. Industrial unions' typical fear of workplace-based particularism opened the possibility, and often indeed produced the reality, of an unlikely compromise.
A domestication of radical unionism is implied with union sections succumbing to a "bias towards cooperation…centred around the needs of the firm" (Howell, 1992: 261) , becoming "functionally indistinguishable from enterprise unions" (Howell, 2009: 236; c.f. Goyer and Hancké, 2004) . A 'micro-corporatist' enterprise consciousness thus prevails, whereby unions internalise employers' competitiveness agenda (Levesque and Murray, 2005: 506) . This is likely to be pronounced under crisis conditions where plant viability and jobs are at stake.
Yet, counselling against union incorporation is a theoretical assessment highlighting radical unions' inelasticity to change (Parson, 2013a) . Drawing on macro-cultural traditions of the French system, this analysis emphasises a "permissive ideational environment" (ibid. 303) for radical action even in conditions of economic crisis. The combined legacies of employer unilateralism, union syndicalism and a dirigiste state willing to moderate the market and shore up the confederations, encourage a mix of militancy and protest for workplace culture (c.f. Milner, 2002) . Allied to widespread cynicism in France about globalisation's merits, an environment exists in which militant contestation retains a high degree of legitimacy (see also Mathers, 2017) . Coercive market forces do not simply disembowel ideological orientations of radical unions, as traditions persist and mediate crisis pressures. Under this scenario, localised bargaining will continue to see evidence of union contestation.
Divergent trajectories within the above literature raise implications for radical confederations, who remain an established feature of France's institutional framework.
Notable here is CGT with a reported 710,000 members. Historically CGT strategy has prioritised political mobilisation at national level (Upchurch et al. 2009 ). Denouncing and refusing to sign agreements have been its hallmark, condemning rival unions that do sign as engaging in class compromise. Yet contemporary accounts emphasise a shift from a "union of refusal" to a "unionism of proposals and negotiations", although the nature and extent of this transformation is unclear (Andolfatto, 2007) . Accounts emphasise declining membership and reduced Parti Communiste Français (PCF) influence over the confederation as encouraging reform (Connolly, 2014 (Parsons, 2015) . There are also accounts of greater CGT willingness to sign agreements (Labbé and Nezosi, 2007; Milner and Mathers, 2013) although this may depend on whether these are distributive or integrative in character and the level at which they occur (national, sectoral or workplace). For some scholars, CGT retains a reputation as a "systematically belligerent ex-communist" union (Clegg and van Wujnbergen, 2011) relative to the reformist bloc comprising France's fractious confederal scene 3 . Negotiated reform is characterised as difficult given "CGT concerns not to cede that which has been gained through struggle" (Parsons, 2013b: 202) . Yet many accounts' focus on national developments may not reflect nuances within a union known for "organised anarchy" and workplace autonomy (Thomas, 2016: 33) . Milner (2012) refers to internal tensions over a perceived reformist drift at national level with grassroots unease about any collaboration with CFDT. As recently as 2013, CGT conferences report grassroots resolve to "return to the 'class struggle', with protests to emphasise their discontent" (Tissandier, 2013 In specifying the kind of strategic choices unions might make in response to competitive pressures at firm level, Bacon and Blyton (2004) period of negotiated competitiveness agreements. Developments are studied at company level and at nine assembly and three powertrain sites, where redundancies were widespread and plant closure was regularly threatened (Table 1) . Evidence was gathered via archival documentation, interviews and observational fieldwork (Table 2) . Table 1   Table 2 Questions of reliability and validity were addressed during fieldwork. Reliability of evidence was corroborated by triangulating across different evidence sources and different unions on the same issues. Regarding validity of the evidence, Strauss's (1987) coding process was followed. Identification of codes was based on patterns laid out in Section 2.
Findings

PSA Company Level
The 2008 crisis prompted substantial employment restructuring at PSA. Initiated with 3,500 redundancies, pay was frozen (2008) (2009) (2010) , followed by a below-inflation increase (2010) (2011) and pay pauses (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . In 2012 PSA announced 8,000 redundancies, with the Aulnay plant, employing 3,600 workers, identified for closure.
Rennes and Sevelnord also risked shutdown with these plans emerging after a CGT press conference presented leaked executive memos to the media, revealing production transfer to either "Turkey, Morocco or Eastern Europe". Announcement of Aulnay's closure produced an alliance involving company and plant sections of CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO and GSEA to develop a social plan for redundancy and redeployment. CGT remained independent of the alliance, as did CFDT. Table 3 identifies the representative unions at PSA in this period. Table 3 Rejecting site closure in principle, CGT proposed saving Aulnay by more egalitarian inter-plant volume distributions, reducing executive remuneration and redirecting dividends and former executive pensions toward financing suspended hybrid projects.
The closure announcement was followed by CGT Aulnay organising a four-month strike involving 300 workers at the site. The strike evidenced flying pickets, reported violence and plant sabotage by CGT activists. CFDT Aulnay initially participated before CFDT centre ordered a return to work. In response, the reformist alliance organised a campaign 'Come Together to Save PSA!', claiming "Trotskyite infiltration" of CGT Aulnay and CGT intimidation of non-strikers. During the strike, the alliance further requested, and management obliged, to bring Aulnay's closure forward from 2014 to late 2013:
The situation at Aulnay can no longer guarantee employees' physical and psychological security. Already heavily affected by the planned closure of their site, these employees should not have to suffer the misconduct, intimidation and harassment of a few troublemakers. Given the circumstances and risks to staff, for the benefit of employees we request the immediate implementation of voluntary redeployment measures under the social plan.
CFE Support was not forthcoming, with FO retorting that CGT was "burying its head in the sand" (FO Sevelnord Communiqué). A plant agreement, signed by CFE-CGC, FO and GSEA, provided a two-year pay freeze, working time extensions when daily production targets were not met and reduced notice periods in disbanding, creating or transferring production teams. In exchange, PSA pledged a three-year no redundancy policy.
Refusing to sign, CGT maintained:
This agreement…could be applied to all of PSA, even the entire auto industry.
We cannot accept such a dangerous agreement…They do not have the right to use the trauma of Aulnay to impose concessions at Sevelnord and say, 'first you sign then you get the vehicle'. proposed inter-confederal cooperation in company-wide strikes to protest PSA proposals. In the interim, CGT organised several one day strikes with subsequent CFDT participation (Table 4) . Table 4 Aside from CFDT participation, CGT calls for wider union involvement went unanswered, apart from CFTC, publically announcing it would not partake as "we do not want to relive the CGT experience at Aulnay and send employees to the job centre...after making them think it was possible to stop the site from closing by fighting"
(CFTC PSA Communiqué). CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO and GSEA combined to ratify NCS in exchange for PSA pledges to maintain production levels, avoid closures until 2016
and launch new models in each plant. Their signatures were criticised by CGT and CFDT, the latter, it appears, under pressure from plant sections. CGT maintained that promises on volumes were too low, essentially "hot air to justify regressive attacks"
(CGT Poissy Delegate). In response, reformists maintained for example:
There are concessions to make. We don't want to become a second Aulnay.
Other unions burnt tyres and intimidated employees, but in the end, did Aulnay stay open? GSEA Tremery Section Leader
PSA Plant Level
Transposing NCS to plants required further consultation to tailor with each site's circumstance around working time in particular. The context of union site representativeness in this period is detailed below. Table 5 Patterns of reformist alliance and CGT independence replicates at three plants. The alliances' stated objectives were to develop "partnership unionism" (Sochaux Alliance), "pragmatic cooperation with management" (Mulhouse Alliance) and "preservation of the site and repatriation of production" (Rennes Alliance). Voting pacts, formed for CE elections, exhibited an anti-CGT stance, evident in circulated communiqués in the plants:
Why make a communal electoral list? Because our ideas on how to defend employees' interests are close: we think negotiation is always the best way. It's through working to draft and sign agreements that we find solutions...It is more effective than other scattered action which can play into management's hands. Certain unions will propose other ways of doing this, but history shows us (take Aulnay, for example) that resorting to violence does not always have the effect that employees expect. Rennes Alliance Communiqué In opposition to NCS negotiations, these plants saw, independent of company oneday strikes, shorter stoppages of varying duration (typically one to three hours) led by CGT or co-led by CGT and CFDT (Table 6) . Table 6 Strikes continued during consultations, with smaller numbers of workers involved.
Justifying such actions, a CGT delegate claimed:
There is no real dialogue, a few delegates can't change management's mind in a meeting. It's our collective force in the workshops that will make them stop being so arrogant and make them eat the NCS. As for thinking that a union can get production workers out of a sticky situation, we don't think it can happen through negotiation. Employees should learn to defend themselves. They should have confidence in their own power, whether they are unionised or not unionised. Our power is in the number of workers we have, it's not about having a few dozen delegates. In reality, we can't negotiate anything with the boss, not without the exercise of power. CGT Sochaux Section Leader CGT coordinated stoppages to overlap NCS plant consultations. As a CGT Mulhouse delegate explained, stoppages were synchronised so "all employees will make themselves heard so that certain unions won't be tempted Company representativeness in this period is outlined below. Table 7 Prior to such negotiations, the alliance sought to coordinate bargaining in annual Renault pay rounds. For CGT, these proved disappointing. Whereas other unions Given what is at stake, we think it necessary to organise a unified call to action. This would help our respective unions to organise collective action at local-level and allow for a larger level of mobilisation…with a view to making management take employees' demands into account. We invite you to join us.
CGT Renault Inter-Union Communiqué
The call went unheeded until later negotiation rounds when Renault threatened plant closures at Douai and Flins to secure the talks' conclusion. Denouncing Renault's threat, a CGT, CFDT, FO company strike was called with 1,700 workers participating across eight sites in January 2012. Two further strikes followed (Table 8) . However, within weeks, CFE-CGC indicated its intention to sign and management concessions removing references to forced redeployment and a guarantee of sufficient production volumes led FO and CFDT to follow suit. Table 8 The By saying "accept the lowest social bid and I will guarantee what I have already given you", management are instigating that, every time models change, another agreement will be needed asking employees to accept further concessions.
CGT Renault Delegate
Renault Plant Level
Transposing the Contract locally entailed further plant consultation on site specific matters. Representativeness in these plants is detailed below. Table 9 Reflecting company trends, an alliance involving CGT formed at Batilly, Cléon, Flins CGT still think that a negotiation cannot be done without blockading factories or protesting on the street. It's easier to never sign and to oppose everything because you can avoid taking responsibility.
CFE-CGC Cléon Section Leader
When CGT says it wants to preserve jobs, it must accept this responsibility. It has found a comfortable place far away from meetings, occupying the media landscape outside of the factory. Unfortunately for them, decisions are not made in this way.
CFDT Sandouville Section Leader
The CGT, SUD, CFTC Batilly alliance combined stoppages with a legal case challenging the Contract's "automatic application" provision to the plant, as the site is (Table 9) .
Discussion
Literature on French trade unionism under decentralised bargaining discerns two contrasting trajectories. The first proposes that workplace bargaining exposes weak unions to firms' competitive pressures, inculcating subordinated compliance, while a second emphasises prospects for sustained militant opposition. While the prevalence of militant opposition among CGT sections in the case study complements the latter interpretation, some qualified elaboration is needed. While cultural traditions are relevant, the findings suggest institutional factors of bargaining structure, reformist union behaviour and electoral competition are equally important in explaining the militant opposition observed.
As discussed earlier, those adhering to militant orientations are inclined to oppose and/or limit the granting of concessions. However, strategic choices of this sort require sufficient resources to be effective. When militants lack resources in sufficient amounts to prevent 'give-backs', the second-best option is to withhold legitimacy from the concessionary process. This is relatively costless to pursue because company bargaining structure and reformist union behaviour provide the necessary 'opportunity structure' (Meyer, 2004) . Concessions employers seek are likely to be negotiated with and ratified by reformist unions, rendering radical involvement superfluous, so long as the latter lack power to block agreements. Once reformists have sufficient representative powers to ratify agreements, militants can defect without pressure from employers, free from the constraints of unpalatable concessions. Thus, the causal links between coercive markets and ideological disorientation of unions noted elsewhere (Hyman, 2001; Murray et al. 2010) are not tightly coupled in the French case given bargaining structure and the multiplicity of reformist unions. These provide sufficient slack for radicals to retain militant opposition at workplace level.
If bargaining structure and reformist willingness to sign agreements enable militant opposition, electoral competition may actively encourage it. Of course, the political science literature on deradicalisation emphasises that when militants run in elections, they convert into vote maximisers, ideologically shifting to the centre to expand appeal (Tezcűr, 2010) . Given the 2008 reform tying bargaining capacity to workplace electoral representativeness, moderation of the militant tendency might have been expected to maximise voter appeal. Yet there is little evidence of this in the case study. Given that the moderate ground is already well occupied in the electoral contest, there is little advantage gained by militants moving into a crowded marketplace, potentially losing distinctiveness vis-à-vis other unions. Militants may calculate that dissatisfaction with reformist concessions will allow those standing outside agreements to grow electorally. Indeed, CGT electoral campaigning in the cases emphasised inter-union difference, portraying reformists as "house unions" complicit in negotiating "anti-social regressions". The hope is that militant populism may trump reformist cooperation.
Discontent might manifest as protest votes, boosting militants' representativeness as observed at some individual plants. Indeed, reformists appear alive to this prospect, regularly justifying their own position by comparing it to the alleged futility of CGT militancy. The fact that militants retain the capacity to appeal to a (declining) constituency of hardcore support suggests representativeness is reasonably assured.
Pressures to revise orientation and action may therefore be stymied in the short term.
What are the implications of this choice pattern for radical relations with employers, other unions and employees? In the case studies, militant opposition appears limited in its capacity to impose costs on employers. Legalistic obstruction may only delay and risks being thwarted by reformists, while strike numbers frequently rely on modest participation rates. While it is conceivable that small numbers of small strikes cause sizeable disruption in lean auto plants (Silver, 2003) , militant opposition has not impacted on the calibre of agreements being struck, and the few successes evident in In sum, the general conclusions to be inferred from this study is that coercive market forces at workplace level do not necessarily induce a shift from militant opposition among radical unions. The capacity for pursuing an independent agenda here is not attributable to internal power resources (Lévesque and Murray, 2005: 509) 
